The problem of re-entry to a high-employment economy by Darryl R. Francis
IS GOOD to have this opportunity to discuss
with you some of my views on the problems we face
as the economy approaches a high-employment level
of activity. With the tremendous expansion of eco-
nomic activity last year following the lackluster period
of 1971, there is little doubt that high employment is
now at hand. Indicators of both current and future
developments reflect a vigorous business expansion
across a broad front.
Economic expansion cannot continue at the ad-
vanced pace of recent months, and most economists
foresee some slowing later this year. I would interpret
a slowing in the pace of economic activity as we reach
a high-employment stage as a healthy sign. However,
for various reasons, which I will discuss shortly, a
slowing in the rate of increase of output may well be
accompanied by an acceleration in the rate of increase
of prices.
If these developments occur, Ia mgreatly con-
cerned that we may see a further expansion of the
Government’s role in economic stabilization. In the
past, calls have been made for more Government
spending to stimulate real economic growth on one
hand, while on the other, price and wage controls
have becn used in attempts to arrest inflation. It is my
view that the reemergence of such policies in the
near future would be a serious mistake, even as we
continue to feel the ill winds of earlier Government
excesses. I continue to believe that appropriate struc-
tural and aggregate demand policies with proven cre-
dentials are standing by, ready for intelligent imple-
mentation, to ease the costs of the winding-down
process. I will discuss them in some detail.
sion are evident everywhere. Retail sales and personal
income are well above year-earlier levels. Housing
starts continue at a pace far more rapid than foreseen
by most experts. Plant and equipment expenditures
are projected by the Commerce Department to in-
crease about 13 percent in 1973, compared to 9 per-
cent last year and 2 percent in 1971.
Output gains have been exceptional. Industrial pro-
duction in April was 9 percent above the year-earlier
level. Real product increased about 7.5 percent in the
year ending fourth quarter 1972, and has registered
an 8 percent rate of grosvth in the first quarter of this
year. By comparison, the trend growth rate of both
industrial production and real product over the past
twenty years has been approximately 4 percent per
year.
The recent expansion of output has been accom-
panied by a significant decline in the unemployment
rate from almost 6 percent in March of last year to
the current rate of about 5 percent. Employment
growth has been exceptionally rapid, but an equally
exuberant expansion in the labor force has ham-
pered further declines in the unemployment rate.
Currently, the ratio of all employed workers to the
population of working force age is higher than at
any time in the twenty-year period preceding 1968, a
period which includes several episodes of uneinploy-
meet rates at or near the 4 percent level.
One interesting aspect of the current 5 percent un-
employment rate in the face of a large increase in the
number of employed individuals is the rapid rise in
such relatively unskilled workers as teenagers, part
time employees, and military veterans, The 5 percent
overall unemployment rate is partially masking the
fact that there are shortages of many skilled workers
including plant electricians, machinists, and certain
types of mechanics and engineers. Also, average
weekly hours of work in the manufacturing sector are
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about as high as in 1969, a year when the unemploy-
ment rate averaged only 3.5 percent.
High rates of plant and equipment capacity utiliza-
tion are being experienced in a number of important
industries. The auto and rubber industries report that
extensive overtime operations have pushed their ca-
pacity utilization rates above levels desired for maxi-
mum efficiency. For all manufacturing industries, the
utilization rate is about 86 percent, not much different
than the high-emnployment rate of the middle 1960s.
The fall in the unemployment rate in recent months
has been accompanied, unfortunately, by an accelera-
tion in the inflation rate, Consumer prices increased
at a 6.6 percent rate in the six-month period ending in
April, compared to a 3.7 percent rate of increase in the
preceding six months. Wholesale prices accelerated to
a 17,3 percent annual rate in the past six months,
triple the rate of the preceding six-month period.
Adverse short-rnn supply conditions in the agricul-
tural sector undoubtedly contributed to the recent
price acceleration, but it will be some time before
these conditions are effectively corrected. Phase II
price and wage controls may have held do\vn meas-
ured prices in some areas in 1972 (although this is
uncertain), but Phase III will be marked by much
stronger wage pressures as a result of more union
bargaining than in 1972 and stronger demand pres-
sures, as reflected in recent income and employment
gains. Of greatest importance in contributing to these
demand pressures has been the recent expansionary
stance of monetary and fiscal policy actions.
STABILIZATION POLICY ACTIONS
Both monetary and fiscal actions were restrictive in
1969 in order to slow inflationary pressures, but since
that time they have become considerably more stim-
ulative. The rate of growth of the money supply in-
creased in each succeeding year from 4.2 percent in
1969 to 7.4 percent in 1972. In comparison, the long-
run trend rate of money supply growth, over the past
two decades, has been only about 3 percent per year.
The Federal deficit (on a national income accounts
basis) expanded from $1.3 billion in fiscal year 1970
to $21.1 billion in fiscal year 1972,
Even if stabilization policies were to become moder-
ately restrictive in 1973 — and evidence at this time is
inconclusive — the lagged effects of earlier expan-
sionary actions would likely contribute to a continued
movement of the economy toward high employment
in the present year. Whether the so-called “mnagic”
unemployment figure of 4 percent would be reached
is another question.
You will notice that I have been talking about a
“high” employment economy rather than one of “full”
employment. The reason is that “full” employment is
often taken to refer to some specific rate of unem-
ployment, such as the 4 percent level. I believe that
attempts to achieve numerical targets of this sort have
probably led to as many problems as they have solved.
The single-minded pursuit of virtually any goal often
results in undesirable side effects. In this case, zealous
pursuit of a target rate of unemployment, without
adequate recognition of the lags in effect of monetary
policy, has often been followed by inflationary
pressures.
What is an acceptable target for unemployment?
I agree with the Council of Economic Advisers that
instead of a number, this “policy goal is a condition in
which persons who want work and seek it realistically
on reasonable terms can find employment.”1
There is no doubt that some unemployment will
exist even under these conditions as individuals seek
the most “reasonable terms” compatible with their in-
dividual job skills. This period of search is heavily
influenced by the availability of job information, the
level of education and skill attained, and the extent of
such job hindrances as the minimum \sage, union non-
price job discrimination, and excessive compensation
for those remaining unemployed. Because tIme im-
portance of these factors varies greatly over time, it
is not possible to say that a feasible goal for the un-
employment rate in 1973 is the same as was observed
a decade or two ago.
Once these structural impediments to employment
are considered, the “high-employment” unemployment
rate which emerges is called the “normnal” or “natural”
rate of unemployment. The unique feature of the con-
cept of a “natural” unemployment rate is that it is
consistent with a stable rate of inflation. Unemploy-
ment rates above the natural rate are usually associ-
ated with price deeelerations and unemployment rates
below it are generally related to price accelerations.
Clearly, if labor market constraints could be lessened
so that demand price pressures would emerge at say,
a 3 percent unemployment rate instead of a 5 percent
rate, the whole economy would profit. Historically,
m
7’he Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers,
1973 (CEA Report), p.
74
. Italics supplied.
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however, the evidence suggests that this variable
natural rate of unemployment has probably been
closer to 5 percent than 3 percent.
Therein lies the problem. Past experience has
taught us that expansionary monetary and fiscal poli-
cies can be used to reduce the unemployment rate
for a period of time below time natural rate; however,
experience has also shown that the cost of doing so
has been accelerating inflation.
I want to be very clear in emphasizing this point.
Socially and politically, an unemployment rate in the
neighborhood of 5 percent has come to be viewed as
unacceptable. Thus, there is great incentive to take
action to reduce it. The types of actions tha-t \vould
reduce the natural rate of unemployment are vemy
difficult to implement. and slow to take effect since
they involve fundamental improvements in the struc-
ture of our labor markets.
In contrast, stimulative mnonetamy actions are rela-
tively easy to implement and operate with a fairly
short and predictable lag. You can imagine the temp-
tations and the pressures on monetary policymakers
to take actions that would result in a near-term re-
duction in unemployment, even if it is fully recognized
that the results of having done so will he an accelera-
tion in the rate of inflation sometime in the future. My
view of the lags in the effect of monetary actions on
production, employment, and prices is such as to im-
ply that it is necessary to begin reducing the amount
of monetary stimulus well in advance of observing
something approximating full employment and full
utilization of capacity.
By analogy, I might characterize mny view as being
similar to the situation faced by astronauts returning
to earth from a flight in space. You all are well aware
that, as our spaeemen begin to get closer to home, the
earth’s gravitational pull causes -their speed to accel-
erate. Yet, they also begin to experience increased
friction when they encounter the earth’s atmosphere.
Thus, it is necessary for them to fire their retro-rocke-ts
at a fairly early stage of the re-entry in order to avoid
achieving too much speed and generating too much
heat.
To a space scientist, as well as the general public,
this seems to be a logical action to take at the time.
But in the re-entmy phase of economic stabilization, it
seems much less obvious to most observers, including
Government officials, that the monetary authorities
should fire their retro-rockets, and begin to reduce the
amount of monetary stimulus at a time \vhen unem-
ploymnent remains at a fairly high level.
This illustration is my way of expressing the view
that the chief role of policymakers is to avoid plung-
ing the economy sharply down one path and then
correcting sharply in another direction. It is my belief
that the economy is basically stable and, if given a
chance, would not need the nimble talents required
of an astronaut whose on-board computer has failed
during the descent to earth. In other words, despite
repeated calls for mnoderation, stop-and-go perform-
ance has been the effect of so-called “stahihzation”
policies for years.
Now let me turn to a few remarks regarding a con-
straint on the ability of monetary authorities to follow
the approach I have suggested. A major factor influ-
encing central bank operations at various times is
changes in the Federal Governnent’s budget position.
When the Federal budget is in surplus there need not
be much of a problem, but at times when deficits oc-
cur, as they have in 14 of the past 20 fiscal years, the
monetary polieymakers feel obligated to take this into
consideration in arriving at their policy decisions,
The problem can be put quite simply: the short-run
effect of the issuance of Government bonds to finance
deficits is to increase market interest rates. Since in-
teres-t rate movemnents have usually weighed heavily
in the Federal Reserve decision-making process, this
upward pressure on interest rates is met with resist-
ance in the form of open market purchases for the
accounts of Federal Reserve Banks. Often an unde-
sired, hut vemy important, side effect is the increase
in the money supply generated by such actions,
Thus, the dilemmna of the monetary policymaker in
these deficitsituations is deciding whether to risk more
monetary expansion than is consistent with reasonable
price stability, or accept a period of financial stress
with its accompanying negative effects on the real
sector. The enactment of realistic tax programs to
cover burgeoning Government expenditures would
first remove an unnecessary constraint on monetary
stabilization actions, and second, focus the taxpayers’
attention more clearly on the costs of Federal programs.
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
As re-entry into high emnployment occurs, as it in-
evitably must with an economy which has been ex-
panding in real terms at a 7 percent rate relative to a
4 percent long-term potential, the questions arise as to
when, and how hard, the retro-rockets should be fired.
At least, these issues arise if you agree that very
stimulative monetary and fiscal actions cannot be pur-
sued indefinitely.
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One of the best ways to insure that highly stimula-
tive monetary actions will not be maintained too long
would be to keep a lid on Government spending. In
that way, the deficits which have indirectly influenced
monetary expansion in recent years could be mnini-
mized. Independent of stabilization actions, the ex-
panded role of Government spending in the L’S. econ-
omy is due for careful re-examination. Governnient
spending on goods and services relative to the total
economy doubled from 11 percent to 22 percent in
the twenty-five year period ending in 1972.
Once the time for less expansive policy actions is
identified, I see at least three approaches to “firing the
rockets.” One would be to adopt a very restrictive
stance and hold it for an extended period of time. This
has been done on previous occasions, with economic
recession the usual consequence. However, in the
present circumstances, Id onot think such a severe
policy reversal is yet required. There is still time to
make a mid-course correction toward more moderate
actions.
A second approach would be to move gradually in
the direction of long-tenn fiscal and monetary stabili-
zation targets consistent with long-rnn price stability
and a high level of employment. A third alternative is
to move immediately to the long-run target. At this
time, the lag patterns associated with the current di-
rection of the economy into the high-employment
stage and the response of the economy to a proposed
policy shift are under study. I can only say that I
favor neither the extreme of maintaining accelerated
policy stimulus, nor a policy which \vould slow the
economy to the recession point.
I must point out -that any permanent slowing of the
rate of mone-tary expansion would be accompanied by
temporary adjustment costs in the form of a slowing
in the rate of growth of output and employment. The
costs would be less now, however, than if -the adjust-
ment period were postponed.
Finally, I would like to conclude with the observa-
tion that monetary and fiscal actions need not “go it
alone” as we re-enter the critical high-employment
stage. There are numerous legislative actions which
could be taken to lower unemployment at the same
time orthodox stabilization actions become less stim-
ulative. Provisions for additional job training and less
costly job information, modification of the minimum
wage which tends to keep teenage unemployment so
high, revision of our social welfare policies to create
maximum incentives to work, and curbs on business
and labor non-price job discrimination are some of
the possible mneasures.
So far as inflation is concerned, the most appropri-
ate structural measures for the current situation are
those which increase the sup-ply of goods and services.
Some of the actions along this line which have already
been taken include the temporary suspension of oil
import quotas, mneat import quotas, crop acreage allot-
ments, and the release of Government stockpiles of
certain goods. There exist far mnore supply restrictions
which could be eliminated, thereby contributing sig-
nificantly to the battle against inflation.
With regard to wage and price controls in a high
employment economy, again I agree with the Council
of Economic Advisers who noted in 1970 that
Experience with [direct wage and price measures]
in other countries has been remarkably consistent. In
some cases success in holding down wage settlements
or price increases has been achieved in certain indus-
tries. There is usually a period in which these pro-
grams may have some overall deterrent effect, though
evidence here is less certain. After an interval, how-
ever, there is a point at which accumulating pressures
make the programs ineffective. American experience
conformed to this pattern. 2
In closing, I would like to stress that the current
high-employment re-entry problem exists only be-
cause of earlier stop-and-go excesses. A continuation
of go actions would bring about a replay of the rapidly
aceelerating prices of the late 1960s, except that the
acceleration would occur at higher levels in the 1970s.
The adoption of severe stop policies would produce
another major recession. If we can adopt and maintain
policies geared to long-run considerations, the high-
employment re-entry problem could become only a
memory of the past.
21970 CEA Report, pp. 23-24.
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